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INTRODUCTION 
"Laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of 
the human mind. " 
Thomas Jefferson 
Every country in the Western Hemisphere has made progress, in some 
cases significant progress, in embracing the rule of law3 and associated 
principles in the establishment of liberal democratic systems of government-
except Cuba. In this context, most nascent democracies have recognized that 
establishing a professional law-based military that respects internationally 
recognized human rights• and is subordinate to civilian control is absolutely 
integral to the legitimacy of the government and to the basic stability of the 
nation. As we approach the dawn of the next century, many now wonder 
whether Cuba might also stand at the door of major political and social changes, 
and whether the Cuban military can make the necessary transition to serving a 
democratic government. 
Indeed, after forty years under a brutal regime supported by a 
totalitarian military, para-military, and police internal security apparatus, 
thoughtful students of history can hardly fail to pose the question, what will 
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3. The most common meaning for the rule oflaw is directly associated with all those rules and 
legal standards of behavior recognized and practiced between States in the context of the 
community of nations. For an excellent discussion, see JoHN NORTON MooRE, LAW AND THE 
GRENADA MiSSION I (1984). Professor Moore states: "Law, however, is vitally important. Even 
in the short run, law serves as a standard of appraisal for national actions and as a means of 
communicating intentions to both friend and foe, and perceptions about lawfulness can profoundly 
influence both national and international support for particular actions." 
4. REsTATEMENT{THIR.o)OFTHEFOREIGNRELATIONSLAWOFTHEUNITEDSTATESCUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIG !ITS § 702 ( 1987). 
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happen when Castro is gone? The central issue is whether the nation will 
embark on the road to true liberal democracy or settle for a continuation of the 
status quo under another dictator.s No one can predict the future with absolute 
certainty, but a single factor seems clear above all others. As was the case with 
the people of the former Soviet Union, the yearning for fundamental human 
rights and democratic freedoms so long repressed in Cuba will streak across the 
horizon with the brilliance of a long anticipated comet. One can only hope, 
then, that the establishment of a government committed to the rule of law is the 
end towards which the onward march of Cuba's history is directed. 
Accordingly, should a fledgling post-Castro democracy actually 
emerge in Cuba, a critical goal for the Cuban people, their government, and the 
United States, should be to restructure quickly the former totalitarian military 
so that it will support, rather than hinder, liberal democratic reforms in Cuba. 
If a new Cuban democracy is to stabilize and flourish, subordinating the military 
to civilian control befitting a democratic system in which the soldier can carry 
out his mission in accordance with internationally recognized human rights 
principles is absolutely essential. In a liberal democracy, the military cannot be 
an independent actor; it must take directions from the civilian government and 
be accountable to society for the way it carries out those directions. 
The focus of this monograph concerns the applicability of human rights 
to the conduct of military actions. Civilian control over the military alone does 
not guarantee a liberal democracy where all citizens and residents of a nation 
are guaranteed fundamental rights and protections. For purposes of this paper, 
a distinction is drawn between "democracy" and "liberal democracy." The 
former defmes a system of government in which the majority rules. The latter 
implies that although the majority rules, certain fundamental individual human 
rights, such as those found in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution, are 
guaranteed to all citizens, and the majority may not infringe upon those rights. 
era liberal democracy, minorities are protected from the possible tyranny 
e majority. 
The brutal and illegal atrocities that have plagued the former 
Yugoslavia, committed by some segments of the Serbian army and police in 
Croatia Bosnia and most recently Kosovo, represent some of the most egregio~~ violations of international human rights since World War II. Yet, the 
Yugoslav 'army and national police acted under orders of a civilian government 
duly electe~ by the Serbian people. Thus, a non-liberal democratic government 
that exercises civilian control over the military, alone, without a commitment to 
human righcl
1
, will not deter abuses against the weakest members of society. 
What can the United States do today to prepare to assist a post-Castro 
Cuban military transition from being an instrument of a brutal, totalitarian 
dictator to a protector of human rights? The thesis of this paper is that the 
United States should develop a specific plan to take advantage of the expected 
opportunity to promote human rights values in Cuba's post-Castro military. 
5. Juan 0 . Tamayo, Castro's Vision Has High Price: Democracy, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 27, 
1999, at lA. 
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The paper will also demonstrate that U.S. military judge advocates6 are uniquely 
qualified to execute this plan and assist the post-Castro Cuban military to 
internalize respect and protection of human rights as part of its fundamental 
reason for existence. 
The paper is divided into four major parts: Historical Context; 
International Human Rights Law; U.S. Military Efforts to Promote Human 
Rights in the Post-Cold War Era; and Human Rights Training for the Post-
Castro Cuban Military. The first part provides the reader with background 
concerning Castro's Cuba in general and the use of the Cuban military as an 
instrument to maintain power. It also summarizes U.S. policy towards Cuba 
over the past forty years in order to help the reader appreciate the highly 
charged domestic political context in which possible United States-Cuba 
military-to-military contacts would take place. Although Americans, especially 
Cuban-Americans', agree on the goal, (i.e., removal of Castro and the 
establishment of a liberal democracy in Cuba), they are radically polarized 
concerning the strategy. The U.S. domestic politics of providing any kind of 
assistance to Cuba, even after Castro is gone, is guaranteed to be emotional. 
The second part of this paper provides the reader with a basic primer 
on international human rights law. The third part introduces the reader to the 
United States military's nation-building roles and missions, specifically 
pertaining to the promotion of human rights values by judge advocates in 
foreign militaries, in the post-cold war era. A successful case study for the 
promotion ofhuman rights in the Peruvian military in 1993 is used to illustrate 
the potential use of U.S. judge advocates in a post-Castro Cuba. 
The fourth and fmal part of the paper specifically addresses the 
promotion of human rights in Cuba' s post-Castro military. First, a brief 
discussion concerning the chances for the Cuban military to honestly seek a new 
direction following Castro's departure is presented. The paper will then offer 
seven specific recommendations to serve as a guide for the formulation of a plan 
to promote human rights values in the Cuban military. The point will also be 
made that it will require strong, honest, and intelligent commitments from the 
Cuban, as well as the American, civilian and military leadership. 
6. U.S. military judge advocates are lawyers licensed to practice in one of the U.S. states or 
federal territories. Between the three services and the Marines, there are over 4000 judge 
advocates serving on active duty in the U.S. military. 
7. Over 1,000,000 Cubans sought refuge in the United States since the 1959 communist 
revolution, most obtaining United States citizenship, and for obvious reasons, most showing 
interest and voicing concern about U.S. policy and strategy towards their land of birth. 
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PART I 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
"EI que oprime Ia isla esc/ava. " 
(He who oppresses the enslaved island.) 
Cuban Idiom for Castro 
[Volume 3] 
Cuba is the largest island of the West Indies Archipelagos and is 
approximately 44,218 square miles in size. In 1492, Christopher Columbus 
discovered and claimed Cuba on behalf of Spain. In 1511, the Spanish Crown 
established the frrst permanent settlement. Cuba remained frrmly under Spanish 
rule for over 400 years until it gained its freedom in 1898, culminating in the 
Spanish-American War. • A democracy-based Cuban Constitution was 
immediately adopted and was replaced with a new one in 1940. Cuba, not 
unlike many Latin American nations, enjoyed periods of authentic liberal 
democratic government, interrupted by periods of dictatorships, from 1901 to 
1959. On December 31, 1958, the dictator of Cuba, Fulgencio Batista, was 
forced to flee the island following a protracted campaign for liberal democratic 
reforms conducted by numerous civil rights groups, culminating in a two-year 
guerilla war led by Fidel Castro and his followers . 
On January I, 1959, Castro took power by force, and by 1960 he had, 
through threats, deception, civil rights abuses, and murder, consolidated his 
power and established frrm political and economic relations with the Soviet 
Union. The Cuban army, comprised of his guerilla followers, played a critical 
role\ in his ruthless campaign of terror. Relations with the United States were 
terms· ated following the Bay of Pigs incident, which occurred on April 17, 
1961.9 
While it is true that Castro took power in Cuba through violent 
revolutio \ he did so, at least initially, with the overwhelming support of the 
Cuban populace and without significant external support. Since then, Fidel 
Castro has Been able to successfully fashion a broadly based nationalistic 
agenda cement\d around himself, as dictator, and the "Revolution." 
There are three major ethnic groups in Cuba's population of 11 
million. Cubans are categorized as 51 percent mulatto, 37 percent white, 11 
percent black, and 1 percent Chinese origin. Religious freedom and practices 
are reemerging in Cuba, with a majority of Cubans identifying themselves with 
Roman Catholicism. Due to the potential for opposition to his regime, however, 
8. After several failed attempts for independence, the Cuban anti-Colonial revolutionaries finally 
succeed with the aid of the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy destroyed the Spanish Navy, thus cutting 
the supply lines from Spain to its troops in Cuba. 
9. The Bay of Pigs refers to the April 17, 1961 , ill-fated attempt by the U.S. to overthrow the 
Castro regime. The U.S. assisted an armed force of Cuban exiles to establish a beachhead in the 
Bay of Pigs, which was quickly defeated and captured. 
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Castro has been generally opposed to religion.10 Nevertheless, social reform has 
always been a centerpiece of revolutionary propaganda. Heavily influenced by 
a state-controlled media, most Cubans believe that the quality of life on the 
island is better than their neighbors. To be sure, the basic literacy rates are 
relatively high for this Spanish-speaking people. In addition, progress in health 
and education since Castro came to power have been fairly impressive, although 
both categories have suffered significant deterioration since the early 1990's. 
For much of its existence, Fidel Castro's Cuba has served as one of the 
most conflictive spots on the planet. A totalitarian regime born out of the Cold 
War between the Soviet Union and the United States, the small island of Cuba 
performed dutifully for almost thirty years as a centerpiece of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and as a front line outpost for communist expansionism. Not only was 
Cuba the scene of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world to the 
brink of nuclear war'', but the Cold War also witnessed the Bay of Pigs incident 
and the use of Cuban combat troops in such faraway places as Angola in 1975, 
and the Hom of Africa in 1977-78. 
With the total collapse of the Soviet Union and the attendant loss of 
massive Soviet subsidies which had allowed Castro to provide basic material 
needs to the Cuban people (Cuba was receiving a $5-6 billion annual Soviet 
subsidy), many in the free world had expected Castro's speedy demise and the 
rapid dismantling of communism in Cuba. Although the loss of the Soviet 
Union has denied Castro the capability to foment actively and support "wars of 
national liberation,"' 2 Fidel Castro and his communist elite remain firmly in 
control of Cuba. In short, Castro's efforts to foster subversion in neighboring 
governments may have declined, but his hold on power in his own country is as 
strong as ever. To date, he has proved to be far more resilient than many policy 
makers had ever imagined. He has accomplished this, if nothing else, by 
demonstrating a masterful use of the international media. Fidel Castro has 
certainly shown himself to be one of the most crafty politicians of the 20th 
century. 
Despite occasional signals which hint at some form of subtle 
repositioning, such as Pope John Paul Il's much publicized visit in January 
1998, most observers believe that Cuba will remain frrmly clenched in Castro's 
dictatorial hands.13 Vowing that he will not "be a Gorbachev," few doubt the 
fact that Castro intends to maintain strict control of Cuba for as long as he lives. 
Castro will not leave office voluntarily or accept any diminution of power such 
as, handing over power to a transitional government. 
With the spread of liberal democracy throughout Latin America and 
the Caribbean, Fidel Castro now stands as the last dictator in the Western 
Hemisphere. However, it seems certain that Castro is not only determined to 
I 0. Cubans Meet their Liberator, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 23, 1998, at 13A. Castro has endorsed 
a "revolution against God." 
II. See Proclamation No. 3504, 27 Fed. Reg. 10401 (1962). On October 23, 1962, President 
John F. Kennedy ordered the interdiction by U.S. forces of the delivery of offensive weapons to 
Cuba by the Soviet Union. 
12. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 163 (1986). 
13. See Pope 's Visit Changes Little in Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, June 26, 1998, at 17A. Following 
the Pope's visit, Castro has largely ignored the Pope's call to allow greater religious freedom. 
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stay in power during the full span of his own life, but he also earnestly desires 
to somehow continue the totalitarian system after his death. To this end, Fidel 
Castro has named his brother Raul as his successor and has appointed other 
party loyalists to carry on the Revolution. 
Castro's greatest vulnerability probably lies in the continued weakness 
of the island economy. With living standards continuing to drop and social 
services deteriorating as well, his gamble is that the economic situation will 
stabilize without the loss of political control. Thus, in order to foster steps for 
the continuation of the Revolution, Fidel Castro has been forced to undertake 
some limited changes in the classic centralized model of his communist 
economy. Expressing an admiration for the "Chinese model," the Cuban 
dictator has embraced, in theory, a policy of economic reform without engaging 
in a political reform. 
On the other hand, Castro has made it crystal clear that regardless of 
economic or social hardships visited on the Cuban people, he will not hesitate 
to use the regime's powerful military and other internal security forces to 
repress any and all opposition. Indeed, both during the Cold War period and 
extending to the present, it has been Castro's authoritarian military and police 
forces which have kept him and the Communist Party in power. Like all 
totalitarian regimes, Cuba's revolutionary leader ensures his continued survival 
by relying heavily on his military and police forces to run an incredibly 
sophisticated and repressive apparatus, which currently holds 3,000 to 4,000 
political prisoners according to Freedom House and around 600 prisoners of 
conscience, according to Amnesty International. 14 In terms of its overall human 
rights rating ending in 1998, Freedom House codes Cuba as "not free," the 
lowest possible rating. u 
One need only read Article 62 of the Cuban Constitution to understand 
what is the most important value to Castro's regime, "[n]one of the freedoms 
which are recognized for citizens can be exercised contrary to ... [the] decision 
of the Cuban people to build socialism and communism." In other words, 
Castro's vision of what is best for the nation or for himself is paramount to the 
freedoms of the Cuban people. The "ends justify the means" declares this 
constitutional article. 
The Cuban Military- Castro 's Instrument of Control 
"Cuba today [1998] is reminiscent of the Soviet Union under Jose/Stalin. " 
Eastern European diplomats remarks to US. Congressional Staff 
The two dominant institutions in Castro's Cuba are the Communist 
Party and the Armed Forces. Both have been successfully used by Castro to 
maintain his iron grip on the island for over four decades. The · Cuban 
Communist Party provided the "brains" of Castro's dictatorship. It ensured that 
14. Cuba at the Crossroads, The Visit of Pope John Paul II & Opportunity/or U.S. Policy: Staff 
Report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and U.S. House of Representatives 
Committee on International Relations, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 4, 1998, at 15. 
15. Roger Doyle, Human Rights Throughout/he World, SCI. AM., Dec. 1998, at 30-31 . 
Promoting Human Rights Values 17 
the Marxist-Leninist ideology permeated every aspect of life on Cuba, which 
placed Castro in the unquestioned position of founder, leader, and protector of 
the "Revolution." The military provided the ultimate "muscle" for Castro, 
ensuring that no one would even dare dream of replacing him as the head of the 
Revolution. 
The Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Communista de Cuba) claims 
approximately 750,000 members. Fidel Castro holds the position of the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party as well as the President of the Council of 
State and the President of the Council of Ministers. Not surprisingly, there are 
no legal opposition parties in Cuba and, as a practical matter, Castro and a close 
circle of senior government advisors make all major policy decisions. In fact, 
although delegates to the Communist Congress are elected, they meet only once 
every five years to provide rubber-stamp approval for the policies of the Castro 
regime. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Marxist-Leninism, the 
influence of the Cuban Communist Party has declined significantly. The 
illogical, false, and farcical rationale that the party provided to legitimize 
Castro's hold on power (i.e., that the Cuban Revolution was part of a world-
wide communist revolutionary movement for the benefit of mankind) has long 
since disintegrated. As a result, Castro must now rely increasingly on the 
"muscle" of his regime to hold on to power. 
There are three main branches of service in the Cuban military: the 
Army Ground Forces (DR), the Navy (MGR), and the Air and Air Defense 
Forces (DAAFAR). In tum, the active ground forces are divided into three 
regional sections across the island: the Western, the Eastern, and the Central. 
The mission of the Western force, the largest of the three, is to defend the cities 
of Havana and Pinar del Rio. The Eastern force is directed toward the U.S. 
Naval Base Guantanamo and the eastern portion of the island. Finally, apart 
from defending the central portion of the country, the Central force is tasked 
with providing reinforcements as needed. 
The active military forces are supplemented by auxiliary organizations 
such as the Youth Labor Army (EJT), the Territorial Militia Troops {TIM), and 
the Civil Defense and Border Guard forces {TGF). The auxiliary forces consist 
of both military and civilian personnel and are organized at the local community 
level. As a matter of fact, the entire country is divided into local civil defense 
cells that must account for all those eligible for military service. In classic 
Marxist form, block leaders are responsible for reporting all activities that occur 
within their block. 
Current estimates of the Cuban active military force is between 50,000 
to 65,000, with an equal number in the reserves. 16 Whether they are active, 
reserve, or auxiliary, all forces are under the Ministry of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces (FAR). The Commander in Chief of the FAR is Fidel Castro. 
The number two position of Defense Minister and General of the Army belongs 
to his brother, Raul Castro, who exercises broad operational control over the 
military. 
16. The Cuban Threat to US. National Security, Published by the Defense Intelligence Agency 
pursuant to Section 1228 of Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 1228, Ill Stat. 1943-44 (1997). 
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The Communist Party of Cuba and the Ministry of the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces have traditionally been tightly linked to one another with the 
Communist Party active at every level of the military. Most of the senior officer 
corps are members of the Communist Party and the military is indoctrinated in 
communist ideology. As stated before, with the loss of its fmancial and political 
sponsor, the Soviet Union, the relationship between the Communist Party and 
the armed forces has grown even tighter, with the armed forces gaining power 
and responsibility. 
Since 1991, there has been no question that Castro has been obliged to 
shift dramatically the focus and mission of his military. Severe resource 
shortages have forced the military to make deep cuts in personnel, training, and 
equipment. According to a recent Defense Intelligence Agency report, the FAR 
has been transformed from "one of the most active militaries in the Third World 
into a stay-at-home force that has minimal conventional fighting ability."17 From 
its prestigious heyday of a well-armed combat force of almost a quarter million 
personnel, the active forces in Cuba are a mere shadow. Economic hardships 
have forced not only the reduction in forces, by many of the traditional fringe 
benefits, such as housing, pay, and recreation facilities have simply evaporated. 
Although Cuban law mandates that all eligible males must serve in the military 
or military reserves for eighteen months, economic hardships make this law 
problematic. Avoidance of fulfilling the associated military training 
requirements for those assigned to the reserves appears to be fairly widespread. 
The traditional Castro-directed mission of defending the island and 
providing military assistance to foreign communist countries including the 
deployment of combat troops to support "wars of national liberation,"'" has 
dramatically shifted to a new focus. In short, the new mission for the FAR is 
nothing less than to maintain the economic, social, and political stability of the 
Castro regime. 
Curiously, this inward mission has witnessed the military actually take 
over much of the social and economic activities in the civilian sector. Turning 
o the Communist Chinese model, a large portion of the Cuban military is now 
h\avily engaged in agriculture and manufacturing, not only producing food and 
goods for its own consumption, but selling these items to the general public at 
a profit. For instance, the Cuban air force even owns and operates the Cuban 
tourist airline, Gaviota, while the army runs the sugar industry.'• 
The most disturbing use of the FAR is its service as the ultimate 
institution to snuff out the exercise of individual human rights in Cuba. When 
called upon, the military assists the police forces in a wide variety of law 
17. !d. at I. 
18. See, e.g., JOHN NORTON MOORE, THE SECRET WAR IN CENTRAL AMERICA ( 1987). 
19. It is not uncommon for militaries in Latin America and Eastern Europe, at national and unit 
level, to engage in commercial enterprises to generate income. The difference between Cuba, 
which follows the communist Chinese model, and the aforementioned militaries, is that in Latin 
America and Eastern Europe, the militaries generate products, services and income for their 
benefit, to make up the shortfalls between appropriations and operational expenditures. In Cuba, 
the military plays a critical role in the agricultural, industrial, and commercial life of the nation, 
not to support itself, but to support the revolution and Castro. The relative roles do not compare. 
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enforcement activities, including the prevention of free assembly, and free 
speech, and the enforcement of prison-like security to prevent citizens from 
escaping the captive island. Dramatic episodes, such as the Cuban military 
shooting down two unarmed civilian aircraft, which killed all four U.S. citizen 
occupants in I996, and sinking a boat loaded with Cubans seeking to escape the 
prison island, which drowned 42 people, including 2I children, in I994, 
received international media attention. Less publicized, however, is the use of 
the military to snuff out spontaneous expressions of free speech and free 
assembly by the Cuban people. Recently: 
Troops sealed off a harbor in northeastern Cuba on Wednesday [July 
7, I999] to keep rowdy crowds from witnessing a standoff between 
Cuban forces and a dozen men and women apparently bent on fleeing 
the island in a boat, residents of the area reported. About I 000 
people gathered around the Puerto Padre harbor at the start of the 
incident Tuesday, with some chanting 'Freedom!' and others using 
dinghies to deliver food and water to the occupants of the stranded 
vessel, the witnesses said. The unusual gathering (assemblies not 
arranged by the government are rare in Cuba) marked the third time 
this year that large crowds have rushed to Cuban ports amid reports 
of illegal escapes toward South Florida. The whole town had lined 
the harbor to support the group yesterday [Tuesday, July 6, I999] by 
I p.m., but everyone went home at night, and this morning the 
soldiers had closed off all the roads, said a woman who lives near the 
harbor. 20 
Military officers from Latin American nations that have had some 
contacts and interactions with the Cuban military report that the Cuban military 
provides some nominal instruction in the Law of War and Human Rights." The 
training, these officers state, is very limited and rudimentary even by Latin 
American standards. In view of the fact that Castro uses the military to 
guarantee the continued existence of his communist regime in violation of 
fundamental human rights, it may be fair to conclude that the minimal human 
rights instruction provided to the military serves only as "window dressing" for 
the benefit of the international community. 
U.S. Policy Towards Castro 's Communist Regime 
"Each generation gives birth to its own tyrants. " 
Winston Churchill 
The United States and the American people, especially Cuban-
Americans, all agree that Castro must go as soon as possible. As a practical 
20. Boat Trying to Flee Cuba Draws Crowd, MIAMI HERALD, July 8, 1999, at I. 
21 . This infonnation, while very sketchy and unsubstantiated by direct evidence, was obtained 
during various conversations between the authors and high-ranking military officers from armies 
in South and Central America. 
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matter, there is probably very little that the United States can do in the short-
term to push Castro out of power. No one expects a Bay of Pigs-styled 
invasion. Over the long-term, there are two views concerning how the United 
States should pursue its goal of removing Castro from power and helping the 
Cubans establish a liberal democracy. One view calls for isolation of the island 
and the other for liberalization of contacts. Although both views desire the 
same goal, they are diametrically opposed as to how to achieve that goal. 
The traditional isolation policy, which is the only policy that has been 
followed since 1960, holds that the United States should ostracize Castro to the 
greatest extent possible, economically, politically, and socially. The 36-year old 
trade embargo and the 1996 "Helms-Burton Act"22 underscore this view. 
The opposing view claims that the United States should open up to 
Cuba to the greatest extent possible. Influential advocates of a liberalization 
policy towards Cuba include many serious observers, such as human rights 
activist Elizardo Sanchez, head of the Cuban Commission for Human Rights 
and National Reconciliation/1 Professor Alberto R. Coli, the United States 
Naval War College, and the New York Times.2• Professor Coli believes the 
U.S. embargo, as codified in the Helms-Burton legislation, should be lifted. 
Like others, Professor Coli is in favor of creating as many contacts as possible 
with Cuba in order to facilitate the transition to democracy once Castro departs 
the stage.25 Other opponents to the current isolation policy believe the embargo 
and travel ban only serve to hurt the Cuban people, not the elite communist 
party members. By lifting the embargo and encouraging U.S. business 
contracts, they argue, the communist system would be weakened and the 
inevitable transition to a liberal democracy would be greatly accelerated. 
Those who hold to the current U.S. embargo position strongly disagree 
with liberalization tactics.26 The Vice Chairman of the Cuban-American 
Military Council, Jose A. Miro Torra, for example, points out that Castro is far 
too sophisticated to allow tourism and U.S. investment to undermine the 
communist system. Instead, if full liberalization occurs, Castro could be 
expected to manipulate the influence of capital investment so that it benefitted 
the businesses owned by the members of his direct power base or the Cuban 
government and not the Cuban people. Furthermore, lifting the embargo may 
actually cause the regime to become more repressive, either over fears that the 
communist party might be weakened or that black-marketing by "Mafia" style 
22 . The "Helms-Burton Act" is the popular name used to refer to the Cuban Liberty and 
Democratic Solidarity Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (1996). 
23. Juan 0 . Tamayo, Activist: Give Cuba A Chance, MIAMI HERALD, July I 0, 1998, at I. 
24. NY. Times Recommends Ending Embargo of Cuba, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 16, 1998, at II A. 
"Arguments justifying the embargo on the basis of Castro's close military cooperation with the 
former Soviet Union became obsolete a decade ago." 
25. Professor Alberto R. Coli, Address at the U.S. Southern Command's 1998 Symposium on 
Defense and Security Issues (Apr. 21 , 1998). 
26. Daniela Deane, U.S. Loosens Restrictions to Help Cubans, Not Castro, USA TODAY, Jan.6, 
1999, at 6A. The Clinton Administration has slightly relaxed the embargo, although there has been 
no fundamental change. 
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organizations might proliferate. 27 Whatever the case may be, the question which 
most concerns supporters of the embargo is, what would be the political 
ramifications associated with an easing of sanctions? As University of Miami 
Professor of history and international studies Jaime Scuhlicki argues, lifting the 
embargo would "[n]egate the basic tenants of U.S. policy in Latin America, 
which emphasize democracy, human rights, and market economies."28 
Specifically, it would send the wrong message to future dictators: 
[T]hat a foreign leader can seize U.S. properties without 
compensation; allow the use of his territory for the introduction of 
nuclear missiles aimed at the U.S.; espouse terrorism and anti-U.S. 
causes throughout the world: and that eventually the U.S. will "forget 
and forgive" and reward him with tourism, investments, and 
economic aid. 29 
Although the U.S. embargo has had little effect on the communist elite 
and actually provides Castro with a convenient excuse for blaming the failed 
communist run economy on the United States, many argue that the embargo 
serves as a powerful international symbol of opposition to Castro and 
oppression and must be maintained at all costs. 
Regardless of whether or not the embargo will be eased or lifted in the 
years ahead, productive steps can be taken now to take advantage of the 
anticipated window of opportunity that will most certainly open once Castro is 
gone. 
The thesis of this paper argues that chief among such steps is the need 
to develop a plan of action specifically tailored to assist the post-Castro Cuban 
military to enact immediate reforms in the context of creating a law-based 
military that is respectful of internationally recognized human rights. If the 
United States desires to take advantage of the anticipated window of 
opportunity, it is imperative that a detailed plan of action to accomplish this goal 
be developed, approved, and resourced. Before examining this action plan, 
however, it is necessary to explore fully the concept of human rights vis a vis the 
totalitarian regime. 
27. Interview with Jose A. Miro Torra, Vice Chairman of the Cuban-American Military Council, 
in Miami, Fla. (July 16, 1998). The Cuban-American Military Council is an organization of 
Cuban American military personnel who have honorably served in the U.S. Armed Forces, the 
Assault Brigade 2506 (Bay of Pigs), the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and the 
Cuban Constitutional Armed Forces. These former soldiers are dedicated to the goal of"putting 
together a highly qualified military cadre that can be trained and organized to professionally assist 
the Cuban people and the FAR as soon as the democratic transition [in Cuba] begins." 
28. Jaime Suchlicki, Lifting Cuba Ban is a Risley Idea, MIAMI HERALD, May 3, 1998, at 6L. 
29. /d. 
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PART II 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
[Volume 3] 
"The trouble with man is twofold- he cannot learn those truths that are too 
complicated and he forgets those truths that are too simple. " 
Rebecca We}t 
No concept has done more to rubricate positive change in the social 
and political spheres of human experience than human rights. Not only has 
human rights emerged as a significant moral and legal force in modem domestic 
and international relations, human rights has increasingly served as the basis for 
reaching consensus on defining the fundamental pillars upon which all "just" 
governments should rest. As the Preamble to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights asserts, human rights serve "as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations."'0 
In its most comprehensive meaning, human rights encompasses all 
those principles and concerns associated with ensuring respect for the inherent 
dignity of the individual human being. Indeed, in this sense alone can 
individuals ever be thought of as "equal" since each human being, regardless of 
his abilities or handicaps, possesses the same right of respect for his person and 
property. What then is the current corpus of human rights and how much of it 
falls into the category of recognized international human rights law? Scholars 
view human rights as chronologically evolving in "generations" and have 
identified three such generations. 
The first generation of human rights deals with the individual's right 
to be secure in the most sacred asset of all- his person. All nations are bound 
by treaty and customary international law" to observe this basic protection 
which stands as the most fundamental precept of international human rights. 
Specifically, a state violates international human rights law if, as a matter of 
state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones seven types of actions: 
(1) genocide;" 
(2) slavery or slave trade;" 
(3) murder or causing the disappearance of individuals;34 
30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(Ill), U.N. DocN810, at 71 (1948). 
31. A state may express its consent to be bound by a treaty in a number of fashions : (I) 
ratification; (2) accession; or (3) a declaration of succession. Even absent consent, however, when 
a norm or standard of practice has reached widespread acceptance in the international community, 
it is said to have passed into the realm of customary international law. The derivation of customary 
principles ofinternationallaw comes from observing past uniformities among nations. Evidence 
of customary international law may be found in "judicial decisions, the writing of jurists, 
diplomatic correspondence, and other documentary material concerning the practice of States." 
The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 
32. See LEO KUPER, THE SOVEREIGN TERRITORIAL STATE: THE RIGHT TO GENOCIDE, HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 56 (1989). 
33. See JOHN T. HUMPHREY, NO DISTANT MILLENNIUM: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 20 (1989). 
34. Center for Human Rights, United Nations, Fact Sheet No. 6, Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, U.N. Doc. GE. 89-15259 (1989). 
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( 4) torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment;35 
(5) prolonged arbitrary detention; 
(6) systematic racial discrimination;'• or 
(7) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights. 
23 
The second generation of human rights are related to political and civil 
claims. Unlike the first generation human rights, second generation human 
rights are only binding on those nations who obligate themselves by treaty or 
domestic law because no binding customary international law exists at present. 
Second generation rights are concerned with the individual and his right to be 
"free from the state in his civil and political endeavors."37 Second generation 
rights are set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights'8 
and include the broader civil and political freedoms of religion, movement, 
peaceful assembly, association, expression, privacy, family rights, fair and 
public trial, and participation in government. These human rights are 
fundamental to the fullest development of the individual, for without the basic 
guarantees of freedom, to which these rights speak, the full potential of the 
individual can never be realized. For those who mistakenly equate human rights 
with social equality, however, second generation rights present a paradox, as 
each individual is free to enjoy the consequences of his own decisions without 
government interference-good or bad. 
In contrast to the second generation of human rights, there is no great 
or growing international movement towards the third generation of human 
rights. Third generation rights are different from first and second generation 
rights because they move from restricting governmental behavior vis a vis the 
individual, to mandating that the government perform numerous social and 
welfare actions for the individual. Third generation rights include such issues 
as working conditions, social security, education, health care, resource 
development, food, the environment,39 humanitarian assistance,'0 and peace.< ' 
Since the military is a primary institution of a state, it is obligated to 
fully comply with the first generation of human rights law, and if the state is 
35. See MAITHEW LIPPMAN, THE PROTECTION OF UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE PROBLEM OF 
TORTURE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 65 (1989). 
36. Center for Human Rights, United Nations, Fact Sheet No. 18, Minority Rights, U.N. Doc. GE. 
91-18616 (1992). 
37. Center for Human Rights, United Nations, Fact Sheet No. 16, The Committee on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (1991). 
38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1976). 
39. See HENN-JURI UIBOPUU, THE INTERNATIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT OF AN INDIVIDUAL TO 
A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT CONTAINED IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 151 (Richard 
P. Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 1989). 
40. See Phillip Alston,lntemational Law and the Right to Food, in FooD AS A HUMAN RIGHT 162 
(Asbjom Eide et al. eds., 1984). 
41. See Katarina Tomasevski, The Right to Peace, in HENN-JURI UIBOPUU, THE 
INTERNATIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT OF AN INDIVIDUAL TO A CLEAN ENVIRONMENT CONTAINED 
IN HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 168 (Richard P. Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 
1989). 
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party to treaties requiring compliance with second (and third) generation human 
rights, then the military must comply with those as well. In this context, the 
most troubling aspect is the difficulty of understanding why soldiers, or more 
precisely, governments, commit violations ofintemationally recognized human 
rights. Clearly, this is a critical issue of how to halt gross human rights 
violations. Objectively, much of what we know about the nature of man comes 
from the record of his history, a record written in streams of blood. For 
example, to observe that various governments have engaged in gross human 
rights violations against their own people describes their behavior, but only 
partially explains it. In fact, no one has ever satisfactorily explained why certain 
societies- ancient Assyria, Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Mao's Communist 
China, Saddam's Iraq, Milosevic's Yugoslavia, or Castro's Cuba- turned into 
aggressive war machines that committed horrible first generation human rights 
violations against their own people as well as others. 
What has been established are the characteristics of those nations that 
have a high propensity for engaging in aggressive war and internationally 
recognized human rights abuses. Professor John Norton Moore, Director of the 
Center for Law and National Security, University of Virginia School of Law, 
points out that totalitarian regimes are considerably more likely to resort to such 
aggressive violence than democracies. Professor Moore terms this phenomenon 
the "radical regime" syndrome. 
A radical totalitarian regime ... seems to blend together a mixture of 
a failing centrally planned economy, sever limitations on economic 
freedom, a one party political system, an absence of an independent 
judiciary, a police state with minimal human rights and political 
freedoms at home, a denial of the right to emigrate, heavy 
~volvement of the military in political leadership, a large percentage 
of-~ devoted to the military sector, a high percentage of the 
population ffilhe military, leaders strongly motivated by an ideology 
of true beliefs including willingness to use force, aggressively anti-
Western and anti-democratic in behavior, and selective support for 
wars of national liberation, terrorism, and disinformation against 
Western or democratic interests.•2 
Recognizing a nexus between the nation that mistreats its own citizens 
and the nation that fosters aggression against its neighbors, "[b ]oth the Preamble 
and Article I of the United Nations Charter make crystal clear that the framers 
were under the impression that the unleashing of aggressive war occurred at the 
hands of those States in which the denial of the value ... of the individual 
human being ... was most evident."•' Furthermore, with the outstanding 
research ofUniversity of Hawaii Professor R.J. Rummel, it is now possible to 
demonstrate numerically the validity of the proposition that totalitarian regimes 
are the chief abusers of internationally recognized human rights: 
42. JOHN NORTON MOORE, ET. AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 77 (1990). 
43. RICHARD B. LILLICH& FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 776-77 (1991). 
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War is not the most deadly fonn of violence. Indeed, I have found 
that while about 37,000,000 people have been killed in battle by all 
foreign and domestic wars in our century, government democide 
[genocide and mass murder] have killed over 148,074,000 million 
more. Plus, I am still counting. Over 85% percent of these people 
were killed by totalitarian governments.« 
25 
So long as Cuba remains under the iron grip of Castro, the Cuban 
military will continue to support the communist regime at the expense of human 
rights of the Cuban people. When the long awaited window of opportunity 
opens, however, the U.S. must be prepared to act quickly to offer assistance to 
the Cuban military to learn, train and internalize Human Rights values. The 
central question is how best to quickly instill solid internationally recognized 
human rights values in the military. Furthennore, such values become solid and 
irreversible only through the development of institutions designed to promote 
them. 
PART III 
U.S. MILITARY EFFORTS TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE POST-
COLDWARERA 
"No greater disgrace can befall the army and through it our whole people, 
than the perpetration of barbarous outrages upon the innocent and 
defenseless. Such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetrators and all 
concerned with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of 
the army, and destructive of the ends of our movements. " 
General Robert E. Lee 
During the Cold War the U.S. military was forced to devote almost all 
of its resources toward protecting the free world from the aggressive threat of 
the Soviet empire. The armed forces of the United States provided the military 
muscle and the political backbone of the Western alliance. As such, the Cold 
War period was the classic example of the traditional use of military force-
combat soldiers trained and prepared to go to war at any moment. The 
American armed forces were war-fighters, pure and simple. As the Soviet 
Union began to implode, the free world realized that it was not only the military 
might of the United States that defeated communism, but also the ideals 
represented by the United States. It was what Americans have always 
represented to the world, respect for human rights and freedom. It can be 
argued that the U.S. military fixed the Soviets in place, but American ideals 
ultimately caused Soviet communism to disintegrate. In this context, America's 
most precious asset has always been the export of human rights concerns to the 
rest of the world. Coupled with a fantastic military force, this is America's 
44. RJ. RUMMEL, DEATII BY GoVERNMENT: GENOCIDE AND MASS MURDER IN mE TwENTIErn 
CENTURY 12 (1994). 
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greatest weapon against those who still seek to wage aggressive war and those 
who would still deny basic human rights to their citizens. 
With these ideals in mind, the U.S. military is now being called upon 
to engage in new missions that would have been unthinkable just a few short 
years ago. However, it is important to note that these new missions are not the 
harbinger of some form of American imperialism. Rather, it is the response of 
a world hungry for the establishment of institutions that can guarantee the full 
range of human rights that has given birth to many of the U.S. military's new 
missions. The promise of a new era where the world strives to be free from the 
constant scourge of war and human rights abuse demands that the U.S. military 
expand its traditional role of war-fighter and enter actively into new, non-
traditional roles. Indeed, beginning in the late 1980's, the U.S. military has 
responded by assisting in such areas as drug reduction, disaster relief, 
humanitarian assistance/peace operations, and nation building. 
Because they are viewed as excellent force multipliers, these new 
missions have dramatically changed the role of the U.S. military. The concern 
for promoting internationally recognized human rights in general mirrors the 
overall U.S. national security policy of peacetime engagement by maintaining 
contacts with allies and friendly governments for the purpose of imparting 
values and ideals associated with democratic principles. 
One of the most far reaching non-traditional roles of the U.S. military 
is in the realm of nation building. The U.S. military defmes nation building as 
"assisting a host nation in its efforts to restructure, reinforce, or rebuild its 
formal and informal institutions."•s Starting in the 1960's, the U.S. military has 
been involved in providing nations assistance through the Foreign Assistance 
Act of 196146 anCIOther Congressional authorities to friends and allies ~ throu!!hou~orld. Most of these activities are centered on helping emerging 
~cies develop the military capability to defend themselves from internal 
and external aggression. However, in recent years, Congress has also 
authorized the U.S. military to undertake activities designed to improve the 
standard of living for the inhabitants of these developing nations. As a result of 
this specific authority, U.S. military forces have been engaged in numerous 
humanitarian and civic action projects, such as road building, medical care, well 
drilling, and minor construction projects.47 
Many of these activities are conducted during combined military 
training exercises between the armed forces of the United States and the host 
nation. The exercises are designed primarily to deter external aggression 
against the host nation. Thus, the use of these exercises to also combat social 
and economic problems of the host nation requires careful planning with the 
host nation government.'" The hope for conducting these humanitarian efforts 
is that by raising the standard of living for the local population, the causes of 
45. THE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY AsSISTANCE, THE DEFENSE INSTITUTE OF SECURITY 
AsSISTANCE MANAGEMENT 3 (12th ed. 1992). 
46. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2301 (1993). 
47. See, e.g., Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA), 10 U.S.C. § 401 (1994). 
48. See Gary L. Walsh, Role of the Judge Advocate in Special Operations, ARMY LAW., Aug. 
1989, at4-10. 
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internal unrest that are associated with conflicts other than war can be curtailed 
before they start. This concept has reaped tremendous benefits in nations as far 
apart as Honduras and Thailand. •• These engagement missions help promote 
peace by addressing root causes of regional instability, thus reducing the need 
for direct intervention. Many argue, however, that in the realm of promoting 
respect for internationally recognized human rights, such activities do not really 
go far enough; viable law-based institutions in the militaries of the new 
democracies are not fostered. 
At best, the U.S. military humanitarian missions serve as a conceptual 
framework for the most promising use of U.S. military personnel in actual 
nation building missions, that is, U.S. military judge advocates constructing 
systematic packages to build democracy based institutions in the foreign 
military. In the post-Cold War era, great advantages rest in instilling human 
rights values in the military establishments of other nations. 
US. Military Judge Advocates and the Promotion of Human Rights 
Values 
"Had we a place to stand upon, we might raise the world " 
Thomas Paine 
The premier hallmark of a successful liberal democracy is the 
military' s acceptance of internationally recognized human rights concerns. In 
a liberal democracy, the military cannot abuse internationally recognized human 
rights; it must respect human rights and must be held accountable to civilian 
authority under a rule of law for the way it carries out its missions. The military 
must understand that soldiers are not just people who have technical skills and 
!ighting skills, but are citizens who understand their role as a member of an 
organization with rights and responsibilities in a constitutionally liberal 
democracy. 
In the past, the United States relied heavily on a variety of military 
security assistance programs in the hopes that basic human rights values 
compatible with democratic principles might be instilled in various host nation 
militaries. Since the U.S. effort was geared only at exposing the individual 
foreign soldier to first and second-generation human rights ideals through 
lectures and visits, institutional reform within the host nation military never 
really occurred. Essentially, the promoting of human rights and democracy was 
an indirect benefit at best, rather than an explicit goal. Now, with the collapse 
of communism and the emergence of the United States as the world leader, 
numerous nations from Peru to Ukraine have shown great interest in a more 
"hands on" U.S. military type of assistance. They wish to establish proper law-
based institutions in their military establishments. 50 
49. Jeffrey F. Addicott, Developing a Security Strategy for Indochina, 128 MIL. L. REv. 35 
(1990). 
50. See Jeffiey F. Addicott & Andrew W. Warner, Promoting the Rule of Law in Militaries of 
Emerging Democracies, NAT'L SECURITY L. REP., Mar. 1993, at I. 
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The full promotion of democratization in the new democracies involves 
matters that cannot be assigned to the jurisdiction of any single department of 
the U.S. government. However, the promotion of internationally recognized 
human rights in the militaries of the new democracies is best left to the U.S. 
military's judge advocates. Accordingly, the Defense Department's (DoD) 
greatest contribution to fostering new democracies is by working to improve the 
relationship between emerging democratic governments and their militaries by 
institutionalizing respect for internationally recognized human rights in the 
armed forces. 
The U.S. military legal departments have a central role to play in 
designing a coherent strategy to promote law-based institutions in the foreign 
military establishment. Through a variety of U.S. legal assistance programs at 
least some foreign militaries have been exposed to the two hundred year old 
U.S. "success story" of how a professional military can maintain a superb 
combat record while operating under civilian control and in accordance with 
fundamental human rights concerns. 51 Indeed, the U.S. military is universally 
recognized and respected as the most efficient, professional, and humanitarian 
armed force in the world. 
Recognizing that the armed forces in non-democratic states have been 
used as the primary tool of the totalitarian leadership to perpetuate human rights 
abuses, the major U.S. concern must be to take specific actions that can promote 
and assist the host nation's armed forces to institutionalize respect for first 
generation human rights. To do this, the U.S. military has turned to its military 
lawyers, a uniquely qualified asset for this job. 52 
From its inception in 1775, the U.S. Army has incorporated legal 
officers as an integral part of the American military establishment. In the 
modem U.S. military, all services of the armed forces have officers who serve 
as mi~ttomeys or judge advocates. In the usual process to become a judge 
adVoCate, one must first be an attorney authorized to practice law in one of the 
-------fifty states in the United States. Applications are then screened and a certain 
number of the most highly qualified attorneys are offered a commission in the 
military. The new judge advocate then completes military legal training at a 
special military legal training facility before he or she is assigned to his or her 
first duty station. 
In the Army, there are currently just under 1,500 judge advocates 
ranging in rank from First Lieutenant to Major General. 53 These officers are 
organized into a Judge Advocate General's Corps. Within the Department of 
Defense, there are also a small number of civilian attorneys that oversee 
political and legal issues for the civilian leadership of the military. 
United States judge advocates serve as an action-based resource 
capable of advising and responding to a variety of legal problems. 
Traditionally, judge advocates are tasked to provide support to the U.S. military 
51. See e.g., Jeffrey F. Addicott, Operation Desert Stonn: R.E. Lee or W.T. Shennan?, 136 MIL. 
L. REv. 115 (1992). 
52. See Thomas J. Feeny & Margaret L. Murphy, The Judge Advocate General's Corps, 1982-
1987, 122 MIL. LAW REV. 4 (1988). 
53. Judge Advocates in the other services include: Air Force, Navy, and Marines. 
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in the context of military justice, military administration, environmental law, 
labor law, legal assistance, contacts, procurement, intemationallaw, law of war, 
and other areas. In general, the principal function of any judge advocate is to 
provide advice on legal matters to the commander and his staff, to ensure that 
all activities are carried out in accordance with U.S. domestic and international 
law. In turn, commanders and staff officers are well accustomed to soliciting 
and accepting the advice of their lawyers in all aspects of operation. 
The very existence of a Judge Advocate General Corps serves as a way 
to institutionalize the American commitment to the positive values of military 
proficiency and ethical integrity. Furthermore, by doctrine, lawyers oversee all 
of the regulatory requirements associated with providing law of war, code of 
conduct, and standards of conduct training to all U.S. soldiers. 54 As a result, few 
militaries in the history of mankind can match the record of the U.S. military as 
it has functioned under a rule of law, either in the realm of respecting the law of 
armed conflict, ss providing a fair system of justice for its soldiers, or operating 
under civilian control. 56 
The new non-traditional roles of the U.S. military have required 
attendant new demands on the military legal profession. While the U.S. military 
is shrinking in size, these new non-traditional roles have actually dictated an 
increase in the amount of legal support demanded of judge advocates. To deal 
more effectively with the legal issues related to the new military missions, in the 
late 1980's, the Army Judge Advocate General's Corps formally recognized a 
new practice of law, encompassing several traditional legal disciplines called 
"Operational LaW" (OPLA W).57 When practicing operational law, judge 
advocates are concerned with legal issues associated with the law of war, 
security assistance, intelligence law, status of forces agreements, contracting, 
claims, combined training exercises, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, peace 
operations, drug interdiction, training of foreign military legal officers, and 
other related matters. By its very nature, OPLA W mandates that judge 
advocates not only deal with operational law issues as they exist, but as a 
concurrent function, they must be prepared to anticipate future developments in 
military operations; ensuring the identification, discussion, and implementation 
of those legal doctrines essential to evolving missions in the field. 
54. See, e.g., H. Wayne Elliott, Theory and Practice: Some Suggestions for the Law of War 
Traineer, ARMY LAW., July 1983, at I; James A. Burger, International Law- The Role of the Legal 
Advisor, andLawofWar Instruction, ARMY LAW, Sept. 1978, at22; William H. Parks, The Law 
of War Advisor, 31 JAGJ. I (1980). 
55. See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONGNATIONS(J986). The law of armed conflict is drawn 
from several sources including international agreement, custom and practice, judicial decision, and 
general principles oflaw. 
56. But see Fredrick A. Graf, Knowing the Law, PROC., June 1988, at 58. If the record of the U.S. 
military is measured against the actual rules, and not against its adversaries, it has "been far from 
perfect." 
57. "That body oflaw, both domestic and international, impacting upon legal issues associated 
with the planning for and deployment of U.S. forces overseas in both peacetime and combat 
environments." David E. Graham, Operational Law: A Concept Comes of Age, ARMY LAW, July 
1987, at 9. See alsoJeffiey F. Addicott, Operational Law Note: Proceedings of the First Center 
for Law and Military Operations Symposium, ARMY LAW., Dec. 1990, at 4 7. 
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In tenns of providing training of international human rights issues to 
U.S. personnel, judge advocates are an integral part of an educating and 
reporting system. Under this system, American soldiers are taught to focus on 
identification of conditions or actions which may constitute gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights and proper reporting mechanisms of 
those violations. Paragraph 13-3, Anny Regulation 12-15, Joint Security 
Assistance Training, contains a list of the key violations which U.S. soldiers 
should be able to recognize. These violations mirror those found in Common 
Article III of the Geneva Conventions: 
(I) violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, 
mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture; 
(2) taking hostages; 
(3) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment; and 
( 4) the passing of sentences and carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples.'" 
All U.S. soldiers are obligated to report through military channels 
human rights violations they become aware of in accordance with Anny 
Regulation 12-15. These reports are forwarded to the State Department. At the 
same time, U.S. soldiers are instructed that they are not to place themselves in 
a position of investigating human rights violations. The primary role is to report 
I 
violations. When deployed to the soil of a fol reign nation, U.S. soldiers have no 
legal basis to do more than to report the vio ation to U.S. authorities. Still, the 
message that gross human rights violations \are of grave concern to the United 
States is communicated to the host nation military at every opportunity. 
The most challenging and novel dPLA W mission for U.S. military 
judge advocates is to provide assistance to the militaries of the new 
democracies, to defme how the rule of law should fit into their military 
establishments, and how the military itself should p~perly function vis a vis a 
democratic fonn of government. Because one of the ost critical components 
of any democratically based military organization is t e function of the law, 
U.S. judge advocates have responded favorably to requests for assistance in 
restructuring. In short, U.S. judge advocates have expanded their mission of 
providing legal support to their own military, to providing assistance in various 
law-based institutional development projects in the militaries of other nations. '• 
The primary concern for U.S. judge advocates rests with how, over the 
long-tenn, the host nation military can be encouraged to accept a reduced and 
more professional role appropriate to a democracy. But even apart from direct 
institutional development assistance, U.S. judge advocates have been used to 
open channels of communication and to establish an infonnation presence with 
58. Paragraph 13-3, Army Regulation 12-15, Joint Security Assistance Training. 
59. Matthew E. Winter, Finding the Law- Values, Identity and Function oft he International Law 
Adviser, 128 MIL. L. REv. I, 6 (1990). 
Promoting Human Rights Values 31 
scores of new democracies. 
A successful strategy to achieve these democratization goals must be 
based on three clearly focused themes directed to the host nation military and 
appropriate civilian government officials:60 
( 1) instilling a greater respect for internationally recognized standards 
for human rights; 
(2) fostering greater respect for and an understanding of the principle 
of civilian control of the military; and 
(3) improving military justice systems and procedures to comport 
with internationally recognized standards of human rights. 
One of the major obstacles to conducting legal assistance projects is 
that many of these emerging and struggling democracies are typically faced with 
the social and economic problems traditionally associated with lesser developed 
countries, ranging from economic chaos to actual armed insurgency. Thus, the 
effectiveness of any assistance program must be measured against the realities 
associated with the specific problems facing the host nation. 
To better coordinate all of the ad hoc U.S. military legal support that 
is currently being provided to emerging democracies, the Judge Advocates 
General of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the Staff Judge Advocate to the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) in May 1993, which established an "Inter-Service Committee on 
International Legal Education."61 The purpose of the Committee is to act as a 
"single reception point for proposals and requests for educational exchanges and 
programs" so that needless overlap and duplication of effort will be eliminated. 
The Committee is responsible for planning, programming, and budgeting all 
U.S. judge advocate activities, which are currently handled by several single 
service programs. The Committee is composed of one senior judge advocate 
from each of the three services and is chaired by one of its regular members, 
with the role of chairman rotating among the services every two years. The 
C~mmittee is charged with four responsibilities. 
\ The first responsibility is to form a strategic plan based on the various 
asset~at hand so that joint training, planning, and reporting standards are 
established for program participants. The second responsibility is to receive 
feedback on completed programs, plan follow up contacts, and cross-feed 
information to the services, to assist in assessing future needs for a particular 
foreign military. This is being accomplished through a data base to capture 
teaching materials and lessons learned from each mission performed under the 
auspices of the Committee. The third responsibility is to develop a plan to 
maximize the use of all available DoD funds efficiently, limit overlap, and 
60. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961), ammended by 
22 U.S.C. § 2347 (1976), which provides the authority for security assistance under the 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. These goals are taken from Title 
II of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1991, 
Pub. L. No. 101-513, 104 Stat. 1991 (1991). 
61 . On file with International & Operational Law Division, Office of The Staff Judge Advocate, 
U.S. Army, Pentagon. 
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prioritize programs. The fourth responsibility is to prepare proposals for 
submission to the various funding sources such as the Traditional CINC 
Activities Fund,02 Secretary of the Army Latin American Cooperation Fund,03 
and International Education and Training ... 
The success of the Committee depends upon a fully integrated, truly 
joint approach to planning, programming and budgeting. In coordination with 
appropriate U.S. agencies, the Committee determines the needs of each contact 
foreign military, prioritizes those needs, identifies the appropriate funding 
source, decides the appropriate service representation of each proposed project, 
and submits proposals to the appropriate funding agencies. The result of these 
activities is a joint long-range plan that delivers a coherent program of military 
legal training and exchange worldwide. 
While legal conferences and information exchanges are important first 
steps in the process of helping these militaries, the most promising approaches 
are the long-term efforts designed to institutionalize the appropriate values into 
the fabric of the host nation military. Thus, in terms of human rights training, 
the concept must be made an institutional element to act as a restraint within the 
system. Only in this manner can real systemic change be made. Accordingly, 
the centerpiece of imy meaningful assistance strategy must shift from targeting 
people in the host nation to focusing on institutional development. If 
internationally recognized human rights are institutionalized in the system, 
people in the system will be obligated to conform. On the other hand, a U.S. 
assistance program directed only at people will not change the system in which 
those people operate. To date, two of the most significant long-term legal 
assistance programs targeted at institutional df velopment of basic human rights 
have been the U.S. Army's efforts with the militaries of Peru and Ukraine.65 The 
paper will now review the Peru initiative to P,rovide a concrete example of a 
human rights training program, that, while not ~erfect, achieved a great deal of 
success. 
The Peru Human Training Initiative 
"This [Human Rights Handbook] is for use by all Military and Police 
Components which have the task of providing instruction to combatants. " 
Peruvian Joint Staff Directive I 992 
Systematic and measurable change from top to bottom occurred in the 
Peruvian military as a result of an in-depth program to institutionalize 
internationally recognized human rights in all branches of the armed forces. 
The lessons learned from this program can be extrapolated and applied to any 
nation serious about fundamental human rights training for their armed forces. 
62. Traditional CINC Activities Fund (TCA), 10 U.S.C. § 168 (1994). 
63. Secretary of the Army Latin American Cooperation Fund (LATM COOP), 10 U.S.C. § 1050 
(1994) . 
64. International Military Education and Training (!MET), 22 U.S.C. § 2347 (1994). 
65. See Code of Conduct for Participants in Military Operations, Kiev, Ukraine: Ministry of 
Defense of Ukraine, Lubava, 1995. 
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From 1992-93, at the request of the Peruvian military, a team of U.S. 
Judge advocates conducted an expansive effort with the Peruvian military to 
create a standardized methodology for institutionalizing a human rights training 
program in their military. For ten years, the Peruvians had been locked in a 
deadly power struggle with powerful terrorist groups who were determined to 
overthrow the government. Groups such as the Sendero Luminoso committed 
massive terrorist acts against thousands of civilians.66 Sadly, in some instances, 
the Peruvian military had responded to the terrorists by engaging in gross 
violations of internationally recognized human rights to include torture and 
murder. The conduct of the military reached the point where the very 
legitimacy of the Peruvian government was in question. 
Before the United States sponsored an assistance project, no system 
existed to provide training to Peruvian commanders or soldiers in the basic 
requirements of first-generation human rights. In addition, the investigative 
process for soldiers accused of human rights abuses was deficient. Clearly, 
Peruvian soldiers in the field had to be given adequate and meaningful human 
rights training if they were to be held accountable. This training had to be fully 
institutionalized into the very fabric of the Peruvian military to be effective. In 
short, this meant the training had to be mandatory for all soldiers on a 
continuing basis. 
Working closely with the Peruvians, a basic training handbook for 
soldiers was developed. The handbook was pocket sized and entitled Human 
Rights- The Ten Commandments for the Forces of Order .0' The handbook was 
adopted quickly by the Peruvian Joint Staff. A team of Peruvian lawyers and 
~leld officers were trained in how to teach the materials. In this "train the trainers" approach, the Peruvian instructors then conducted training for the ntire military over the course of the next year. 
\ The effectiveness of this program is shown by the associated dramatic d~cline in gross violations of human rights committed by the Peruvian armed 
forb~s. No one can deny that there has been a significant improvement in the 
Peruvian military's human rights record since the Fall of 1992. It is no 
coincfrtence that this improvement coincides directly with the Peru human rights 
initiativ~. The Peruvians have made tremendous strides not only in improving 
complian~e, but also in actually punishing those accused of violations. While 
Peru still struggles against terrorist groups, the military has come a long way 
since 1992. For example, the National Coordinator of Human Rights in Peru 
reported little over 70 disappearances for 1993, down from almost 300 in 1992. 
United States estimates put the number of disappearances for 1993 at seventy-
five ... "As of May 1994, the Coordinadora had documented 59 cases of 
enforced disappearance attributed to the Peruvian security forces- of whom 8 
reappeared and 51 remained disappeared- and 35 cases of extrajudicial killings 
66. SIMON STRONG, SHINING PATH 253-56 (1992). 
67. On file with the office of the Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. Southern Command, Miami, Fla. 
68. James Brooke, /8 Months Later, /0 Killings Haunt Peru 's Army, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1994, 
at A3. The number of disappearances is set at 75 for 1993. 
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(including ten cases attributed to "rondas" collaborating with the military.)"69 
Extrajudicial killings by government forces have also declined 
dramatically since 1991. There were 13 3 reported cases, in 1991, 114 reported 
cases in 1992, and less than fifty reported cases in 1993. In contrast, the 
subversives were responsible for 903 assassinations in 1991 and 727 
assassinations in 1992. The 1993 figures indicate the number of Sendero 
Luminoso assassinations reached over 900, with a great number of Sendero 
Lumionoso victims often tortured to death. 
Like any human endeavor, no program is free of fault. Based on 
conversations with officers in the Peruvian military, it appears there is less 
emphasis being placed on the Peru Human Rights initiative today, as compared 
to when the program was initiated in 1993. This weakening of attention and 
support could be explained by a number of factors, such as the significant 
reduction of military operations against terrorists and insurgents in Peru since 
the early 1990's. The Program could also be a victim of its own success, i.e. , 
"the Peruvian Army no longer commits human rights violations, so no further 
training is necessary." Reasons for the diminishment of the program are subject 
to speculation. What is certain, however, is that the program continues to 
survive and provide valuable training to the Peruvian military. 
PARTlY 
HUMAN RIGHTS TRAINING FOR THE"POST-CASTRO CUBAN MILITARY 
Sooner or later, an opportunity to en~e.___Cuban military in the area 
of human rights training will emerge and the United Sia~s must stand ready to 
offer appropriate assistance to the new Cuban govl rnment. Specific 
recommendations will be provided to serve as guidelines fo the formulation of 
a U.S. Cuban military. 
An Openingfor Promoting Human Rights in the Post/ Castro Military? 
Although Cuban communist and military men will have a vested 
interest in maintaining power once Castro has departed, many analysts believe 
some degree of opportunity for sweeping change will open in the immediate 
aftermath of Castro's departure. Of course, how wide and far-reaching the 
opening will be is unpredictable. Because there is no person on the scene to 
project Castro's charisma or Castro's command, which gave him the absolute 
unquestioned loyalty of the military and helped keep him in power, it is 
probable that the new leadership will be obliged to introduce at least some 
political and economic reforms. 
A revealing validation of the fact that there will most certainly be some 
opening for dramatic change in post-Castro Cuba occurred during remarks given 
by Pope John Paul Il's visit to Cuba at an open-air mass in Havana's Plaza Jose 
69. Coordinadora 1993 Annual Report, at 11-12. See also After the Autogolpe: Human Rights 
in Peru and the U.S. Response, The Washington Office on Latin America, July 1994, at 10. 
Promoting Human Rights Values 35 
Marti on January 25, 1998. A U.S. Congressional committee reported that when 
the Pope thanked Fidel Castro, who was seated in the front row, for his 
cooperation with the visit, the crowd of one million Cubans simply refused to 
applaud the dictator: 
We looked around from our spot in the middle of the throng of one 
million. Over the loudspeakers, we heard tiny applause coming from 
the VIP section up front. But all around us, average Cubans stood 
silent. People looked first at their shoes, then each other. And then 
they began to snicker, as they suddenly realized what they had just 
done. With their silence, one million Cubans had just denounced the 
regime; ... one million Cubans had just committed the largest "act 
de repudio" in the history of the Cuban revolution.70 
One positive trend that might prove useful for future direct military-to-
military contacts between the armed forces of the United States and Cuba is the 
apparent desire by the Cuban armed forces to reach out to neighboring militaries 
for professional information sharing. Despite the massive reduction in the 
armed forces and the shift to the new inward missions, the military actively 
seeks to open channels of communication and to strengthen ties with many of 
its counterparts throughout the region. Cuban officers regularly attend military 
conferences and participate in subject matter expert exchanges with a large 
number of foreign militaries. If nothing else, this seems to reflect a desire to 
foster the~age of a nationalistic military rather than a communist or 
revolutionary"one. 
While assistance to a new Cuban democracy will be needed at every 
possible level, cori-ectly defming the role of the military is of utmost concern in 
the expected transition from totalitarianism to a liberal democracy. This is as 
true in Cuba as it is}in any other emerging democratic nation. Keenly aware of 
the military's fonp.er place as the major power institution in Castro's system, 
one can expect ~at the Cuban military of the new ruling system will remain, at 
least in the s~tt term, as a decisive factor in who governs. As is the case of 
many other emerging democracies, the military establishment has initially stood 
as the most stable organization of the new state. Herein lies the paradox, the 
Cuban military may be the strongest national institution to maintain stability in 
the immediate aftermath of Castro's departure, but because of its totalitarian 
background, it also presents a potentially dangerous threat to democratic 
reforms trying to take root.7 ' Thus, since the Cuban military will most certainly 
stand as a major power broker, the immediate target for reform must be in 
crafting a solid democratically based military establishment that respects 
internationally recognized human rights. More than any other aspect of 
promoting democratic institutions, the ethos of the military in this regard must 
be quickly developed. 
70. !d. at I. 
71. Kathleen D. Valenzi, Educating the World's Soldiers, UVA LAw., Fall 1993, at 6 (quoting 
Major Andrew Warner). 
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For the post-Castro Cuban military, the chief legacy of the non-
democratic past will be that they have no frame of reference for operating under 
principles associated with internationally recognized human rights and the rule 
of law. Coming out of a tradition in which the ruling elite of the totalitarian 
state maintained power by using special units of the armed forces as a primary 
instrument of repression against the people, the Cuban military itself was viewed 
as the chief abuser of human rights." The totalitarian Cuban state relied on 
components of the military establishment to maintain power and to suppress any 
threat- internal or external- by any means. Thus, human rights, the rule of law, 
and civilian control are alien concepts to Castro's military. 
Institutionalization must be the criterion. Teaching a few human rights 
classes to a military audience is not a solution; human rights must be 
institutionalized through a systematic training program that provides the 
necessary inculcation. Without the institutionalization of human rights 
principles in the post-Castro military, it is probable that the armed forces will 
quickly respond to totalitarian voices should conditions turn sour. While desires 
for freedom will eventually destroy a totalitarian system, freedom and basic 
human rights are not self-perpetuating, and can only be sustained through the 
creation of concrete law-based institutions. 
Specific Recommendations for a Human Rights Training Program for 
the Future Cuban Military 
"I've seen the way that this country (the US.) operates and this is the way it 
should be. " 
Zaire military student I 
Apart from the incredible amount of hard r ork necessary to develop 
and implement a Peru-type human rights military f.aining program, there are 
several lessons learned that can be used when devt loping a similar project for 
the post-Castro military. These lessons learned/from the Peru program and 
others have been distilled into seven specific recr mmendations. 
1NS1TIVTJONAUZATION OF THE PROGRAM: As demonstrated throughout 
the Peru initiative, any program designed to promote first-generation human 
rights values within foreign militaries must be built upon institutionalizing those 
values into the fabric of that force. Programs designed merely to have U.S. 
personnel teach human rights on one or more occasions will have limited long-
term impact. Such limited programs will fail to instill pride and responsibility 
into the host military, which comes from designing and delivering their own 
human rights curricula for training. 
This "train the trainers" approach is distinguishable from any other 
program because it assimilates the target country's military command structure 
at all stages of the process in the development of a course to train its own 
soldiers in basic human rights law. Thus, this approach provides the most 
promise for success because the target military is more likely to follow through 
72. /d. 
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with programs in which its top military commanders have invested the necessary 
time and resources to develop. There is a direct positive correlation between the 
host nation viewing the program as an indigenous effort and the amount of real 
support that is provided. 
COOPERATIVEPROGRAM,NOTU.S.DIRECTEDCOMMANDMENTS: Formal 
requests for this type of long-term assistance must always originate from the 
host nation government. If the desire is present, the requests need only be 
properly molded and then communicated through appropriate channels. The 
United States, along with other Latin American nations, international 
organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of American 
States, as well as non-governmental organizations, working together, should 
encourage a post-Castro Cuban government to work with other militaries, 
including the U.S. military, to seek assistance in the Human Rights training 
arena. A request for assistance to the United States from the Cubans, however, 
should not be approached as to what the United States is going to do, but what 
the two nations together are going to do. In this manner, the host nation is 
engaged in the reform effort at the very beginning of the process. The lesson to 
apply in a future effort in Cuba is fundamental; only a unified U.S. team 
working together towards common long-term objectives will be able to launch 
and sustain a successful program. 
OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE SENIOR CUBAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY 
LEADERSHIP: Closely related to developing solid requests for long-term 
assistance from Cuba is the task of getting firm commitment for the end result-
real programmatic change. Since the task of institutional reform may require a 
total restructuring of the current system, including the elimination of programs 
that ale counterproductive, the complete cooperation of the senior leadership 
whlset the political goals for the target nation is absolutely essential. 
/ This commitment must be obtained as soon after an initial U.S. site 
s
1
urvey as possible. Because of the expected window of opportunity in Cuba, 
}his support must be quickly developed. In the case of Peru, not only did the 
most senior levels of the military pledge support, but the Peruvian President also 
/promised his full commitment. As a practical matter, the Cuban commitment 
will only be as strong as the attendant coordination of that support through 
senior U.S. Representatives. 
DEVELOP A CURRICULUM THAT REsPONDS TO THE NEEDS OF THE CUBAN 
MILITARY, NOT SIMPLY COPY A MODEL THAT HAS WORKED ELSEWHERE: Once 
Cuba has agreed to the concept oflong-term reform, it is important that the U.S. 
working team not get too far out ahead in advocating that the Cuban military 
come up with the same "ten commandments of human rights" that were used. in 
Peru, or copy other programs used in Ukraine, Colombia, and other places. 
Sensitivity is critical. Planners must take into account nationalistic and other 
characteristics peculiar to each military in developing a human rights 
curriculum. While the first-generation human rights contained in the handbook 
will be the same, they may be expressed and tailored in different ways. In 
addition, the U.S. assistance must be offered at a pace comfortable for the 
Cuban military. Institutionalizing these principles may not come easily to 
people long ruled by totalitarian systems. For instance, the U.S. team must be 
knowledgeable about the historical and political context in which they are 
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operating. 
PLAN FOR THE PROPER FUNDING AND PERSONNEL RESOURCING OF THE 
PROGRAM· Army judge advocates designed and implemented the Peru initiative 
as an ad hoc additional duty to verify the concept of institutional assistance and 
to determine the logistical, administrative, and personnel requirements of such 
a program. The U.S. military now knows that the concept works well. With the 
right personnel and sufficient funding, a long-term assistance strategy for the 
Cuban military shows great promise. However, the U.S. military must plan now 
if it is to make the most of any Cuban requests for help. Estimates for funding 
should be developed along with the identification of potential judge advocates 
to execute the program. This latter point is particularly important because with 
adequate preparation time, the pre-designated judge advocates could begin to 
familiarize themselves with the situation in Cuba. With time, the pool of 
potential judge advocates to execute the program could be augmented, thus 
ensuring there would always be judge advocates ready to take action on short 
notice. 
INCLUDE POLITICAL OPPOSITION GROUPS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PROCESS: As in all relations with foreign nations, one 
needs to be particularly sensitive to concerns from the opposite end of the 
domestic political spectrum in the host nation, especially in Cuba. In this vein, 
the possibility exists that opposition groups might seize on any U.S. assisted 
program as an opening wedge to advance their own anti-U.S. agenda. Efforts 
to include as broad a list of civilian participants as possible is helpful to defuse 
this potential problem. In Peru, the U.S. working team attempted to bring as 
many civilian human rights groups as possible into the overall process. This 
strategy should be followed in Cuba as well. / 
PROVIDE FOR QUALITY CONTROL, l~OTH DURING INITIAL 
IMPLEMENTATION AND LONG-TERM: One of the djstinctive characteristics of a 
long-term program is the need to stay engaged. Indeed, quality control 
mandates that the United States continue to mdnitor the program once it has 
been instituted. Measurable standards for positive advancement need to be 
developed. This can be done by counting the number of soldiers trained and by 
closely following further reports of gross human rights violations. 
As demonstrated by the impressive drop in human rights violations 
since the implementation of the Peru program, ibstitutionalization and continued 
engagement is key. It is essential that conticts be continued, to allow the 
institutionalization to grow from the roots. Planners for the effort in Cuba must 
understand that the program is not a "one-shot deal"; tracking the program is as 
critical as establishing the program. Finally, assisting the Cuban military in 
human rights must flow hand-in-hand with actions taken by the nation to 
promote its political, economic, and social growth in a manner that responds to 
the needs of society. 
I 
I 
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CONCLUSION 
"The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old 
parchments, or musty records. They are written, as with a sun beam in the 
whole volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity itself; and can never 
be erased or obscured by mortal power. " 
Alexander Hamilton 
If the U.S. military is going to offer realistic assistance in fundamental 
human rights reform in the post-Castro military, U.S. policy makers must be 
alerted to the necessity for developing an assistance program that can provide 
the fundamental benefits of institutionalization. By any standard of evaluation, 
the Peruvian initiative stands as a paradigm for a meaningful U.S. assistance 
strategy in Cuba. This program has no equal in simplicity, focus, and potential 
for positive change in the militaries of the new democracies. 
In addressing the issue of promoting democratic reform in the new 
Cuba, the United States must focus on the empirical studies, which have 
conclusively demonstrated the murderous behavior of totalitarian governments. 
As Professor Rummel stated: "The way to end war and virtually eliminate 
'democide' appears to be through restricting and checking power. This means 
to foster democratic freedom."1' It is a simple fact that those militaries who 
truly abide by internationally recognized human rights will support and not 
threaten democratic development. In tum, healthy liberal democracies are less 
likely to resort to aggressive warfare to settle international disputes. Thus, it is 
9learly in the best interest of the United States to guide the militaries of other 
nations, such as Cuba, towards greater respect for basic human rights. The end 
of Castro's totalitarian system will offer a unique opportunity for the United 
States to help advance the peace and extend greater respect for internationally 
recognized human rights. 
If the United States is serious about promoting peace, it is time to 
abandon the "show-case" approach to promoting human rights; teaching human 
rights classes does not answer the problem. Perhaps the teaching approach was 
sufficient for the Cold War era because there were no opportunities to do more 
than teach. However, in the post-Cold War era, teaching is not a sufficient 
answer to the requests for institutional human rights reform, which hopefully 
will surface in the aftermath of Castro's demise. 
In a nutshell, an action plan for the post-Castro military 
would have the following goal and means of achievement: 
Goal: To assist in institutionalizing internationally recognized human 
rights values and the concept of civilian control in the Cuban armed 
forces . 
Achievement: 
*assist in the development of a viable teaching curriculum and 
standard handbook on internationally recognized human rights for the 
73. R.J. Rummel, Power Kills; Absolute Power Kills Absolutely, HAIKU lNST. OF PEACE REs., 
Oct. 20, 1991, at 17. 
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Cuban armed forces ; 
*assist in training a cadre of Cuban military instructors ("train the 
trainers approach") to deliver the curriculum to the Cuban soldiers; 
*obtain the necessary formal commitments through written regulation 
from the highest levels of the Cuban government and military to 
implement mandatory human rights training based on the curriculum 
and handbook for all military personnel; and 
*ensure the institutionalization of the human rights program within 
military by maintaining close professional contacts. 
Finally, the development of such a human rights training program is 
not only a morally correct activity for the U.S. military to pursue, but given the 
never ending struggle to promote America's national security within the 
framework of a shrinking defense budget, the use of U.S. judge advocates is 
also an extremely wise use of limited assets. While the other non-traditional 
military activities directed at drug reduction, disaster relief, humanitarian 
assistance, and nation building reduce human suffering and misery at the 
individual level, assisting in the institutionalization of basic internationally 
recognized human rights in foreign militaries, such as Cuba's military, has the 
potential to directly reduce the threat of aggressive warfare. United States 
military attorneys must prepare now to be ready to work together with the new 
Cuban armed forces. 
